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NOTES
The Single-Scheme Exception to Criminal Deportations and
the Case for Chevron's Step Tuo
David A. Luigs
lNTRODUCTION

In 1992, the State of Georgia convicted Akintunde Taofik
Animashaun of two counts of criminal forgery. 1 Both of
Anim.ashaun's crimes resulted from- actions he took as part of a
plan to steal some furniture. First, Animashaun completed an instant credit application at a furniture store using a false identity.
1\vo days later, he arrived at the store's warehouse to pick up the
furniture and presented a receipt with the forged signature. These
actions supported convictions for two separate crimes: for forgery
on the credit application, and for forgery on the delivery receipt.2
Because Animashaun was a native and citizen of Nigeria who
had entered the United States in 1981 as a student, his two crimes
enabled the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to institute deportation proceedings against him on its authority to deport
aliens who commit multiple crimes.3 Although Animashaun had
become a permanent resident after marrying an American citizen,
1. See Animashaun v. INS, 990 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 557 (1993). The
Fifth Circuit's opinion recites all of the facts that are discussed in the text
2. The Fifth Circuit's opinion does not explain the exact relationship between the receipt
and the credit application. The full discussion in the opinion reads: "On August 11,
Animashaun completed an instant credit application at a furniture store using a false identity;
on August 13, Animashaun arrived at the store's warehouse to take delivery of that furniture
by presenting the receipt with the forged signature." Animashaun, 990 F.2d at 237. It appears that the "receipt" was a copy of the "application" that Animashaun had previously
filled out, such that it constituted a second forgery because it was another presentation of a
forged signature.
3. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 125l(a)(2)(A)(ii)
(Supp. II 1990). Tue Attorney General is principally responsible for enforcing and administering the immigration laws. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN,
IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND PouCY 101 (2d ed. 1991). These laws dictate which aliens,
under what conditions, can immigrate to the United States, id. at 119, and when they can be
deported, id. at 498. The Attorney General has delegated most of the responsibility for enforcing and administering the immigration Jaws to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Id. at 101.
The INS performs a variety of immigration-related tasks dealing with enforcement, service, and adjudication. Id. at 102-04. Deportation is one of the INS's enforcement functions;
it removes an alien from the United States. Id. at 475. The immigration Jaws provide various
grounds by which the INS can impose this process on an alien. For example, the INS may
deport an alien if she misrepresented material facts on her immigration application or if she
has committed certain crimes while legally residing in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1251
(Supp. II 1990); see also ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra, at 498-543.
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he remained an alien subject to the immigration laws. The legal
authority for Animashaun's deportation derived from section
241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes the INS to deport legal resident aliens who are convicted of
"two or more crimes involving moral turpitude."4
The deportation provision provides an exception, however, for
those aliens who commit multiple crimes "arising out of a single
scheme of criminal misconduct. " 5 Relying on a recent Ninth Circuit
opinion6 that interprets this exception to cover multiple crimes that
an alien plans and executes together as part of a single plan,
Animashaun argued that his convictions fell within the exception
because both of. his crimes arose from his single plan to steal furniture. The INS disagreed, contending that the exception applies
only when an alien's multiple crimes arise out of a single act.
At a deportation hearing,7 an immigration judge agreed with the
INS's single-act interpretation and held that Animashaun's crimes
did not fall within the exception.s Animashaun appealed to the
To initiate a deportation proceeding, an INS officer files an order to show cause with the
office of the local immigration judge and serves the order on the affected alien. This order,
which requires the alien to show why she should not be deported, explains the deportation
proceeding and infonns the alien of the statutory and factual grounds for deportation. Id. at
543. The inu¢gration judge presides over deportation hearings and decides whether to order
tennination, grant pennanent residence, or order deportation. Id. at 543.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 125l{a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990). There is a long line of cases explaining
which crimes involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., Okoroha v. INS, 715 F.2d 380 {8th Cir. 1983)
{holding that possessing stolen property involves moral turpitude); Tseung Chu v. Cornell,
247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892 {1957) {holding that tax evasion involves
moral turpitude); In re Flores, 17 I & N Dec. 225 (BIA 1980) (holding that fraud, as a general
rule, involves moral turpitude); In re Rosario, 15 I & N Dec. 416 (BIA 1975) (holding that
voluntary manslaughter, even without malice, constitutes moral turpitude); In re Moore, 13 I
& N Dec. 711 (BIA 1971) (holding that breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny
involves moral turpitude). See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 503-24;
CHARLEs GORDON & STANLEY MAli.MAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 71.05
(1994).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added). The full text of this
provision reads: "Any alien who at any time after entry is convicted of two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single
trial, is deportable." 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)-(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990).
6. Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990).
7. At a contested deportation hearing, a trial attorney presents the INS's case, and the
INS bears the burden of proving the alien's deportability by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). The immigration judge hears
evidence and testimony presented by both sides and comes to a decision ordering a tennination, granting pennanent residence, or ordering deportation. See generally ALEINIKOFF &
MARTIN, supra note 3, at 110; Jack Wassennan, Practical Aspects of Representing an Alien at
a Deportation Hearing, 14 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 111 (1976).
8. The INS does not adjudicate most immigration issues; instead, a separate umbrella
organization within the Department of Justice, the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR), contains other adjudicative bodies that hear most immigration disputes. 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.l(a)(l) (1994). The Department of Justice segregated these adjudicators - the immigration judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the Administrative Appeals Unit
(AAU) - from the INS in an effort to separate the enforcement and the adjudication of

March 1995]

Note-Single-Scheme Exception and Chevron

1107

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)9 which affirmed the immigration judge's decision. The BIA adopted the INS's view that crimes
arise out of a single scheme only when they are the consequence of
a single act:
When an alien performs an act that in and of itself constitutes a complete, individual, and distinct crime, he is deportable when he again
commits such an act, even though one may closely follow the other,
be similar in character, and even be part of an overall plan of criminal
misconduct.10

The BIA reasoned that Animashaun's crimes did not fall within the
single-scheme exception because they "were two complete, individual, and distinct acts" 11 - namely, the two· different instances of
presenting a false name.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit,12 Animashaun again challenged
the BIA's single-act interpretation of the single-scheme exception,
but the Fifth Circuit concluded that it had no choice but to adopt
immigration issues. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 109. Aleinikoff & Martin
explain that the
[n]ew regulations separated the corps of immigration judges from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and placed them in a new unit, known as the Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR), located in the Department of Justice and directly accountable to the Associate Attorney General. ... [I]t is clear that EOIR now controls the
budget available to immigration judges and provides directly for support services. Today, no immigration judge is answerable to anyone in the Service, and this different line
of accountability provides an improved structural assurance of adjudicative neutrality.
Id. at 109-10. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for "special inquiry officers,"
now known as immigration judges, to conduct the most dramatic and important adjudications: proceedings to exclude or deport aliens. 8 U.S.C. §§ 10l(b)(4), 1225(b), 1226(a),
1252(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Immigration judges also take part in "proceedings to rescind
an admitted immigrant's adjustment of status under [§ 246 of the Immigration and Nationality Act], in proceedings to withdraw the approval of schools previously authorized for attendance by nonimmigrant students, 8 C.F.R. § 214.4, and in hearing challenges brought by aliens
ordered not to leave the country under the departure control provisions of 8 C.F.R. Part
215." ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 110.
9. Aliens found to be deportable at an initial deportation hearing have the right to appeal
to the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1994). The Attorney General set up the BIA as
a multimember body to review these appeals. Although the BIA has existed since 1940, it
has never been authorized by statute and exists only because of regulations promulgated by
the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(a)(l) (1994); see also ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra
note 3, at 112.
10. Animashaun v. INS, 990 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir.) (quoting the BIA's decision in In
re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992 WL 195812 (BIA May 22, 1992)), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 557 (1993); see infra section I.B.1 (explaining the BIA's single-act test).
11. Animashaun, 990 F.2d at 236.
12. Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act establishes federal judicial review of deportation orders. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (Supp. II 1990). The statute provides that
the procedure established by the Hobbs Act, codifie9 at 28 U.S.C. ch. 158, shall be the exclusive procedure for review of deportation orders. The Hobbs Act governs judicial review of
several other administrative agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission,
the Federal Maritime Commission, and the Interstate Commerce Commission. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2341-51 (1988). This Act vests the power of review in the federal appellate, rather than
district, courts. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 862. These courts are required to
uphold the Board's fact findings if they are supported by "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1988).
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the BIA's "single-act" test.13 The court explained that because the
meaning of the statute was ambiguous, the landmark Supreme
Court case of Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 14 required the court to defer to the BIA's view. In Chevron,
the Supreme Court announced that a federal court applying an ambiguous statute must defer to any reasonable interpretation
adopted by the agency atlministering the statute. Courts have generally referred to this rule as having two steps: At step one, a court
determines whether the statute clearly answers the interpretive
question at issue. If the statute is unambiguous, the court will give
effect to the statute's clear meaning. But if the statute is ambiguous, the court moves on to step two: determining whether the
agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable and permissible.
Chevron requires courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.15 Applying the Chevron rule to the
Animashaun case, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it had to defer to
the BIA's "single-act" test, and it affirmed Animashaun's deportation order.16
Other circuits, however, have interpreted the single-scheme exception differently and refused to defer to the BIA's interpretation.
Instead of focusing on whether the multiple crimes arise from a single act, these courts focus on the alien's state of mind. In applying
their interpretations of the exception, the Second, Third, and Ninth
Circuits ask whether the alien's crimes were planned together and
executed as part of a single plan. 11 The First Circuit asks a slightly
different question - whether the alien had sufficient time to reflect
between the commission of the two crimes to change his mind and
halt his course of criminal misconduct.1B None of these courts that
13. Animashaun, 990 F.2d at 237.
14. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
15. See infra Part II (discussing the rule in Chevron).
16. 990 F.2d at 237. The court made clear, however, that precedent required its holding
because a prior Ftfth Circuit case had held that Chevron applied to the single-scheme exception, requiring deference to the BIA's single-act test. See infra note 60 and accompanying
text (discussing the Ftfth Circuit's precedent requiring the Animashaun court to defer to the
BIA's view). The court hinted, however, that it thought Chevron deference was inappropri·
ate in this case and that absent stare decisis, it might have held that Chevron did not require it
to defer to the BIA's interpretation of the single-scheme exception. 990 F.2d at 237 n.3
("Were we reviewing this agency interpretation without our precedential guidance, we may
have reached a different result. We are, of course, bound by our [prior] holding ••••"); see
also infra Part III (arguing that Chevron does not require courts to defer to the BIA's single·
act test). In 1993, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Animashaun's case, and he was
deported. Animashaun v. INS, 114 S. Ct. 557 (1993).
17. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990); Nason v. INS, 394
F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d 34 (3d Cir.
1963). See generally infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the single-plan test).
18. See Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977). See
generally jnfra Part I.B.3 (discussing the time-to-reflect test).
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reject the BIA's interpretation, however, have analyzed the issue
under Chevron.
.
This Note applies the two-step Chevron analysis to the singlescheme exception and argues that courts should reject the BIA's
single-act test. In applying Chevron, this Note uses the narrow controversy over the proper interpretation of the single-scheme exception as a window on the larger ambiguity that plagues the Supreme
Court's Chevron jurisprudence. This Note suggests an answer to a
broader issue that has remained unclear under the Supreme Court's
precedents: how courts should review agency interpretations at
Chevron's second step. Part I discusses the text and legislative history of the single-scheme exception and surveys how courts have
interpreted the exception, explaining the three competing approaches: the single-act test, the single-plan test, and the time-toreftect test.
To determine how courts should apply Chevron to the BIA's
choice among these tests, Part II focuses on what courts examine at
each of Chevron's two steps. This Part first explains the numerous
criteria the Supreme Court has employed under Chevron's first step
in deciding whether a statute clearly answers an interpretive controversy. Then it addresses the broader question on which the
Supreme Court has provided little explicit guidance: what courts
should do at Chevron's step two. Part II argues that although
courts have often engaged in cursory review of agency interpretations at Chevron's second step, the rationale of Chevron and a careful review of the Supreme Court's case law on deference to agency
interpretations of statutes support a more rigorous standard of review. This Part concludes by providing an appropriate structure for
judicial review at Chevron's step two.
Part ID applies this understanding of Chevron's two steps to
conclude that courts should not defer to the BIA's single-act test.
This Part first argues that the ordinary meaning of "single scheme"
embraces the single-plan test. But even if the meaning of the exception were ambiguous, this Part concludes that courts should reject the BIA's single-act test at Chevron's step two - as an
unreasonable and impermissible reading of the statute.

I.

APPROACHES

To

INTERPRETING THE SINGLE-SCHEME
EXCEPTION

This Part describes the background to the controversy over interpreting the single-scheme exception. Section I.A examines how
the text and legislative history of the exception leave the meaning
of "single scheme" unclear. Section I.B des·cribes the approaches
taken by the BIA and the different courts in defining the exception.
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The Text and Legislative History of the Exception

Section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
permits the INS to deport an alien who commits two or more
crimes of moral turpitude, but it creates an exception for aliens
whose multiple crimes arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.19 The section provides:
Any alien who at any time after entry is convicted of two or more
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of
criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and
regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is
deportable.20

Congress gave no explicit guidance regarding how this exception
should be understood. The Act's "definitions" section, while thorough, does not define single scheme of criminal misconduct, 21 nor
does the legislative history shed any light on the intent of Congress
in drafting this provision.22 The House Report advises merely that
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990). The Immigration and Nationality Act
authorizes the INS to deport aliens for several other reasons. The INS may deport five broad
classes of aliens: (1) aliens who were excludable at the time they entered the country or who
have violated or adjusted their status since entering the country in such a way as to become
deportable (e.g., by smuggling illegal aliens into the United States or by failing to maintain
employment); (2) aliens who have committed "criminal offenses," with different rules governing aliens with a single criminal conviction, multiple convictions (the subject of this Note),
aggravated felonies, controlled substances, firearm felonies, and other miscellaneous crimes;
(3) aliens who fail to register or provide a change of address to the Attorney General as
required by the Act or who have engaged in document fraud; (4) aliens who are deportable
on security and related grounds (e.g., aliens who endanger national security or who engage in
terrorist activity); and (5) aliens who, within five years of entry, have become "public
charges." 8 U.S.C. § 1251(Supp.II1990).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (defining more than fifty terms).
22. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 2046, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1753; S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653. Courts that have examined the
statute's legislative history have universally agreed that it is not helpful regarding this issue.
See Nguyen v. INS, 991 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The legislative history of the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act offers no illumination as to congressional intent regarding
what constitutes a single scheme of criminal misconduct for purposes of the exception •••• ");
Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448, 449 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977) ("The
legislative history, while atmospheric, sheds no light on [§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)]."); Nason v.
INS, 394 F.2d 223, 227 {2d Cir.) ("[T]here is no meaningful legislative history to illumine the
meaning of the specific statutory language 'two crimes ..• not arising out of a single scheme
of criminal misconduct'"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825, 82829 (9th Cir. 1959) {"The Act does not define what is a 'single scheme of criminal misconduct.'
Nor does the legislative history shed any light on what was the intent of Congress in drafting
this provision."); In re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992 WL 195812 at *3-4 (BIA May
22, 1992) ("[T]he legislative history provides [no] assistance or insight into what Congress
meant by the phrase 'single scheme of criminal misconduct.'").
Some courts have observed, however, that the 1952 Immigration Act "was looked on
generally as more restrictive than prior legislation." Pacheco, 546 F.2d at 449. "The section
itself replaced a gentler one under which the alien, to be deported, must have been 'sentenced more than once to [a term of one year or more].'" Pacheco, 546 F.2d at 449 n.3; see
also Costello v. INS, 311F.2d343, 348 (2d Cir. 1962). But the generalized idea that the prior
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"[t]he bill contains detailed and comprehensive provisions relating
to the apprehension and deportation of aliens who are within the
deportable classes."23 This Report discusses several of the definitions contained in the Act's definitions section but does not advise
how to construe undefined terms.24
B. Three Different Interpretations
The different immigration, district, and circuit courts that have
considered Section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) have interpreted the singlescheme exception in different ways. Although the courts' opinions
are often imprecise and unclear, these interpretations can be
grouped into three competing approaches: the "single-act" test, the
"single-plan" test, and the "time-to-reflect" test. The single-act test
asks whether the nature of the crimes essentially makes them one
act. The single-plan test looks to whether the alien planned the entire program of criminal misconduct at a single time before the
crimes. The time-to-reflect test focuses on whether the alien had
sufficient time between the commission of the crimes to reflect
upon them and change her mind.
1.

The Nature of the Crimes: The Single-Act Test

Although the scope of the BIA's definition of section 241's single-scheme exception is not entirely clear,25 its single-act test appears to focus on the nature of the alien's crimes to determine
whether they are sufficiently related that they essentially constitute
one act. As evidenced by the Animashaun case, at its most restrictive this test requires that all the crimes be traceable to a single
physical act. The BIA explained this test in a recent decision, In re
Adetiba:26
[W]hen an alien has performed an act, which, in and of itself constitutes a complete, individual, and distinct crime, he is deportable when
he again commits such an act, even though one may closely follow the
statute was gentler to aliens does not help to determine how much more restrictive the new
statute was intended to be. Thus, the vast majority of courts have not relied on this idea to
support their reasoning in defining the exception. But see Costello, 311 F.2d at 348, in which
the Second Circuit rejected the notion that a single-scheme should be defined as a "common
..• plan" in part because "there is no denying the fact that the Congress by the 1952 Act
intended to make it easier rather than more difficult to deport aliens who were recurrent
criminals." However, the Costello court acknowledged that this was mere dictum, observing
"(b]ut this (discussion] is by the way." 311 F.2d at 348. Later the Second Circuit explicitly
adopted a version of the single-plan test. See Nason, 394 F.2d at 227.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 22, at 56, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1711.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 22, at 31-34, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 168386.
25. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (describing the various different formulations the BIA has developed to articulate its interpretation of the single-scheme exception).
26. In reAdetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992 WL 195812 (BIA May 22, 1992).
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other, be similar in character, and even be part of an overall plan of
criminal misconduct. [Such an approach] recognize[s] that the statutory language was meant to distinguish cases where there are separate
and distinct crimes, but they are performed in furtherance of a single
criminal episode.
Under this analysis, there would exist a single scheme of criminal
misconduct where one crime constitutes a lesser offense of another or
where two crimes fl.ow from and are the natural consequences of a
single act of criminal misconduct.27

This language suggests that the BIA believes that Congress created
the single-scheme exception to ensure that crimes that were merely
two different aspects of the same physical act of wrongdoing would
not count as two crimes for purposes of deportation. Under this
narrow conception of the exception, it does not matter whether the
crimes are similar in nature, close in time, or part of the same plan;
so long as they can be traced to two separate physical acts, they fall
outside the exception. The BIA elaborated on this interpretation
by providing an example that a single scheme occurs when an alien
both possesses and passes a counterfeit bill.28 The BIA apparently
considers this to be a single scheme because an alien is guilty of
both these crimes when he performs the single physical act of passing the counterfeit bill.
2. A Prior Conceived Program: The Single-Plan Test

The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have read the singlescheme exception to require a court to determine whether there
was a moment prior to the crimes when the alien conceived of a
single coherent plan embracing all of her crimes.2 9 The Ninth Circuit recently described this test in Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 30 explaining that where the evidence "shows that the two predicate
27. Adetiba, 1992WL195812, at *l (citations omitted). There is some ambiguity in this
language, however, and perhaps the BIA could reread this definition to create a "singleepisode" test that would cover more multiple-crime situations than the restrictive "singleact" test But the BIA has not articulated any separate test to determine when multiple
crimes arise from a single episode. Therefore, given that Adetiba's narrow language requires
that the crimes to result from a single physical act and given the stringent application of this
language in the Animashaun case, this Note takes the BIA's test as it has been applied. But
see infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (describing other ways the BIA has previously
interpreted the exception).
28. In re D, 5 I & N Dec. 728, 730 (BIA 1954). The BIA has also inexplicably provided as
an example the case of an alien who breaks and enters a store with the intent to commit
larceny and, in connection with that criminal act, also commits an assault with a deadly
weapon. In re D, 5 I & N Dec. at 730; see In re B, 8 I & N Dec. 236, 239 (BIA 1958). But
these two crimes, of course, result from two different physical acts. Perhaps this 1958 example is simply out-of-line with the BIA's current test
29. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990); Nason v. INS, 394
F.2d 223 (2d Cir.}, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d 34 (3d Cir.
1963).
30. 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990).
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crimes were planned at the same time and executed in accordance
with that plan,'' the crimes arise out of a single scheme.31 The
Ninth Circuit explicitly distinguished the government's single-act
test: "The statute exempts crimes arising out of a 'single scheme of
criminal misconduct' and not those out of a single criminal act, as
the government would have us read it."32
Other courts applying the single-act test have defined the exception much like the Ninth Circuit. In Nason v. INS,33 the Second
Circuit similarly defined the exception by looking for a single plan:
"[T]he word 'scheme' implies a specific, more or less articulated
and coherent plan or program of future action ...."34 The Second
Circuit also rejected the single-act test, observing that "[t]he statutory language, 'a single scheme of criminal misconduct,' is not so
narrow as a single criminal act or transaction."35 The Third Circuit36 and the few district court decisions construing the statute are
consistent with this understanding of the single-plan test. 37
31. 910 F.2d at 616.
32. 910 F.2d at 616.
33. 394 F.2d 223 {2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). But see Costello v. INS, 311
F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1962), where the Second Circuit earlier had criticized in dicta possible
extreme versions of the single-plan test:
We would not wish, however, to be thought to subscribe to the views expressed in the
cases [supporting the single-plan test] ... nor would it seem reasonable to suppose that
the Congress intended to grant immunity from deportation to those who over a period
of time pursued a course of criminal misconduct, involving numerous successive, separate crimes, consummated at different times but in the same manner, or with the same
associates, or even by the use of the same fraudulent devices, disguises, tools or weapons. Nor, in the case of successive bank robberies ... would it seem that these could be
said to have arisen out of a single rather than two separate schemes of criminal misconduct, simply because the robbers, prior to the first robbery, had in mind and had discussed the robbery of the second bank ..••
Costello, 311 F.2d at 348. Nevertheless, this dictum from Costello was implicitly rejected
when the Second Circuit articulated its version of the single-plan test in Nason. See Nason,
394 F.2d at 227. Moreover, the BIA seems to concede that the Second Circuit has endorsed
the single-plan test In re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992WL195812, at *4 {BIA May
22, 1992) (citing Nason to include the Second Circuit, along with the Third and the Ninth, as
the jurisdictions applying a "more expansive interpretation of the [statutory] language.").
34. 394 F.2d at 227.
35. 394 F.2d at 227 {"Congress .•• reserved deportation for those who, having completed
a criminal scheme, proceeded to commit a fresh crime or to renew the prior course of criminal conduct").
36. The exact test followed by the Third Circuit is unclear. However, in Sawkow v. INS,
314 F.2d 34, 37-38 {3d Cir. 1963), the court approvingly cited Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825 {9th
Cir. 1959), a case from the single-plan Ninth Circuit, in reversing a BIA deportation order.
The BIA has cited Sawkow in listing the Third Circuit, along with the Second and Ninth, as a
jurisdiction applying a "more expansive interpretation of the [statutory] language" than its
single-act test Adetiba, 1992 WL 195812, at *4.
37. See Barrese v. Ryan, 203 F. Supp. 880, 886-87 (D. Conn. 1962) (rejecting the Board's
interpretation of the statute, that a "single scheme" must be equated with "one criminal
episode"); Zito v. Moutai, 174 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Ill. 1959) ("[D]eportation may not be
predicated upon offenses which are part of a single continuing enterprise even though the
offenses are separated by time."); Jeronimo v. Murff, 157 F. Supp. 808, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
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These courts have clarified that to satisfy this single-plan test a
plan must be a coherent, premeditated design embracing all of the
alien's future crimes. For example, the Second Circuit in Nason explained how an alien's vague intentions did not rise to the level of a
plan:
Petitioner's nebulous intention to repeat his crime ... some day in the
indefinite future, will not bridge the gap of nine months [between the
crimes]. The word 'scheme' implies a specific, more or less articulated
and coherent plan or program of future action, much more than a
vague, indeterminate expectation to repeat a prior criminal modus
operandi. As used in the statute, 'scheme' is not to be construed as an
abstract concept or strategy capable of future application at any time
and any place, but planned definitely for none.3s

The Ninth Circuit cited Nason in adopting this strict definition of
plan in a recent case, Leon-Hernandez v. INS. 39 In Leon-Hernandez, an alien who was convicted of two acts of sexual misconduct with a minor argued that his crimes arose from a single scheme
because both crimes resulted from his ongoing relationship with the
minor whom he believed to be his girlfriend. The court rejected
this relationship as sufficient to constitute a single scheme, because
Leon-Hernandez
did not show that the crimes were executed according to any considered plan .... At the very most [the evidence of his relationship with
the minor] implies only that Leon-Hernandez had, at some time, a
"nebulous intention to repeat his crime with the same ... victim[ ]
some day in the indefinite future." In the absence of evidence of a
more conscious, coherent "plan or program of future action," the
BIA's determination that Leon-Hernandez's crimes did not arise
from a single scheme of criminal misconduct is reasonable.40

These cases demonstrate that although defendants may allege that
their crimes were carried out pursuant to a single plan, courts require more than mere vague or continuing criminal intentions to
satisfy the single-plan test.
Much of the case law explaining the scope of this test concerns
what evidence the INS must present in order to meet its burden of
showing that the alien's crimes did not arise out of a single
scheme.41 The practical effect of the single-plan test has been de(observing that all the acts and transactions described in the indictment were closely "connected together" constituting the "parts" of one "scheme and plan").
38. 394 F.2d at 227. The Second Circuit twice considered Nason's case. Nason v. INS
(Nason I), 370 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1967); Nason v. INS (Nason 11), 394 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968) (case referred to in the text). After first remanding the case to
the Board, the Second Circuit eventually upheld the deportation because of the nine-month
hiatus between the crimes and their lack of a relation to the original scheme. 394 F.2d at 227.
39. 926 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1991).
40. 926 F.2d at 905 (citations omitted).
41. See DAN KEssELBRENNER & LoRY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES
§ 6.4 (1994) ("Judicial interpretation of the 'single scheme' phrase has frequently focused on
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termined through these evidentiary rulings. Courts employing the
single-plan test have made clear that they will look to various types
of evidence regarding the nature ang circumstances of the crimes as
well as the time passing between them to determine whether they
arose out of a single scheme. As the Ninth Circuit explained in its
1959 decision, Wood v. Hoy:
It may be that in some cases the proof of the commission of two
crimes may by the very nature of the crimes themselves, or the time
or circumstances of their commission, be reasonable, substantial and
probative evidence that they did not arise out of a single scheme of
criminal misconduct.42

Several courts since Wood have considered the nature, circumstances, and timing of the crimes to determine whether they arose
out of a single scheme. The courts considering this type of circumstantial evidence have generally held that the government failed to
carry its burden where the alien's crimes were similar in nature and
committed within a short time of each other. For example, in
Wood, the defendant alien had committed two similar robberies
with the same three cohorts within three days of each other, and the
evidence showed that the defendant had agreed with his co-defendants to commit these crimes at one meeting prior to the crimes.43
The Wood court held that, given the similar nature and circumstances of the two crimes and in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, the government had failed to meet its burden of showing
that the alien's crimes did not arise out of a single scheme.44
Similarly in Gonzalez-Sandoval v. INS, 45 the state of California
convicted Gonzalez-Sandoval of two bank robberies.46 Because he
robbed the same bank twice within three days and because he testified that he conceived of both crimes simultaneously as part of a
single plan, the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's deportation orthe issue of evidentiary sufficiency. The introduction of the conviction records alone is not
necessarily sufficient to meet the government's burden."). The BIA has accepted that the
government has the burden of proving that the alien's crimes did not arise from a single
scheme. In re Pataki, 15 I & N 324 (BIA 1975); In re T, 9 I & N 646 (BIA 1962); see also
Nason, 394 F.2d at 226; Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1959).
42. 266 F.2d at 831. The Second Circuit has provided an even more extensive laundry list
of criteria to be examined:
[E]vidence of the similarity of two crimes in terms of intent, motive, purpose, techniques, similarity of victims and the like may often be significant on the issue of the
existence of a "single scheme," especially in serial crimes. Such evidence may establish
that what appeared at first blush as separate and distinct crimes may, indeed, have been
spawned by a single criminal scheme. But, it does not have that conclusive significance
so that it could, by itself, outweigh other overwhelming evidence that the two crimes
were unrelated.
Nason, 394 F.2d at 227-28.
43. Wood, 266 F.2d at 828-29.
44. Wood, 266 F.2d at 831-32.
45. 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990).
46. 910 F.2d at 614.
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der.47 In the absence of any contrary evidence to rebut GonzalezSandoval's testimony and the fact that the crimes were within two
days of each other and directed against the same bank, the court
held that the government had failed to prove that the crimes did not
arise out of a single plan.48
On the other hand, courts applying the single-plan test have
held that where the nature and circumstances of the alien's crimes
differ and especially where the crimes are separated by a substantial
period of time, this evidence alone will satisfy the INS's burden to
show that the crimes did not arise out of a single scheme. For example, in LeToumeur v. INS, 4 9 where an alien's two robberies involved different companions and different stolen goods, the court
held that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the government had met its burden to show that the crimes did not arise
out of a single scheme.so
.
The factor most often used by the government to show the absence of a single scheme is that a large span of time intervened
between the two crimes. Such a large time gap has been held to
carry the government's burden even where the two crimes are similar in nature. For example, the Second and Ninth Circuits have
agreed that two fraudulent tax returns filed in two successive years
presumptively do not arise out of a single scheme.s1 Courts have
also relied on such large time gaps to overcome both evidence that
the crimes were similar in nature and the alien's allegation that he
executed them pursuant to a single plan. For example, in both
Nason and Leon-Hernandez v. INs,s 2 the courts held that the government had met its burden of proof in part due to the long time
interval between the crimes, despite evidence regarding the similar47. Gonzalez-Sandova~ 910 F.2d at 615.
48. The BIA had found Gonzalez-Sandoval deportable by applying its single-act test, see
supra section I.B.l, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the deportation order "because the [immigration judge] and the Board applied a legally erroneous test" - the single-act rather than
the single-plan test. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 910 F.2d at 617.
49. 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976).
SO. 538 F.2d at 1371.
51. Costello v. INS, 311 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1962); Chanan Din Khan v. Barber, 253 F.2d
547 (9th Cir. 1958). Chanan Din Khan, in fact, articulated as a "presumption" that crimes
involving somewhat different circumstances and separated by a large amount of time do not
arise out of a single scheme. See Chanan Din Khan, 253 F.2d at 549-50. Later courts hnve
referred to this "Chanan presumption" in holding that the INS had met its burden of proof
by demonstrating such dissimilarities between the alien's crimes. See, e.g., Nason v. INS, 394
F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). In both Chanan and Costello, the alien
offered no evidence to rebut the presumption created by these facts. Costello, 311 F.2d at 347
("The acts constituting the commission of these two crimes are separated by a substantial
interval of time. In the absence of additional facts to support an inference that the two
crimes [were] related, we think the [immigration judge] was required to find [no single
scheme].").
52. 926 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1990).
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ity of the crimes and despite the aliens' contentions that the crimes
were pursuant to a single plan.53

3. Mental State During Commission: The Time-to-Reflect Test
In Pacheco v. INS54 the First Circuit formulated a slightly different interpretation of the single scheme exception by focusing exclusively on the time that passes between the two crimes and whether
this time was sufficient to permit the alien to change her mind
about her criminal misconduct:
[A] scheme, to be a "single scheme," must take place at one time;
there must be no[] substantial interruption that would allow the participant to disassociate himself from his enterprise and reflect on what
he has done....
. . . [B]oth the purpose of the statute and the use of the adjective
"single" point to a temporally integrated episode of continuous activity. When the immediate activity has ended, even though a 'scheme'
calls for future activity a participant has his second chance to make a
decision. He need not further pursue a multistage scheme.55

The First Circuit's test is similar to the single-plan test in that it
focuses both on the circumstances of the crime and on the defendant's state of mind. But, under the First Circuit's test, a court looks
to the defendant's state of mind between the commission of the
crimes, not before them. If the defendant has sufficient time to
change her mind, the crimes do not arise out of a single scheme.
The First Circuit has twice applied this test. In Pacheco, the
court held that the defendant's two separate acts of attempted burglary against a restaurant and a church within three days did not
arise out of a single scheme, despite the defendant's arguments that
the two break-ins resulted from a single prolonged period of drunkenness, that the time interval between them was brief, and that his
technique and companions were the same in both crimes.56 In Ba53. Nason, 394 F.2d at 225 {holding that there was no single scheme despite the defendant's contention "that except for the use of a different fictitious name, the crimes in every
other respect were identical: his intent and purpose were the same, as was his mode of operation; the merchandise ordered was of a similar type and the victims in both cases were
publishing houses and various New York department stores."); Leon-Hernandez, 926 F.2d at
905.
54. 546 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1976), cerl denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977).
55. 546 F.2d at 451-52.
56. 546 F.2d at 451. In rejecting the BIA's single-act-transaction test, Pacheco provided
another example of a set of facts that would fall within its time-to-reflect test, but not within
the BIA's test:
[W]hile "transaction" might cover the generality of cases, such as a bank robbery which
encompasses an assault on bank employees, we can conceive of more than one separate
criminal transaction occurring within a short time period and emanating from the same
enterprise. For example, a bank robbery might involve not only an executable assault
against bank employees but also other crimes which could occur in the course of the
escape [such as] theft of a car, assault on a pursuer, reckless driving, and the like. Such,
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logun v. INS, 57 a recent per curiam opinion, an alien's three counts
of mail fraud were separated by four and twenty-four days. The
First Circuit held that "petitioner's separate crimes ... occurred on
widely separated dates. Petitioner had ample opportunity between
crimes to change direction. Accordingly, his convictions do not
arise from a 'single scheme'. ..."58
The First Circuit has also explicitly distinguished the INS's 'single-act' test, observing that "[t]he government wishes us to adopt
the formulation of a 'single transaction.' We think that to equate
'single scheme' with 'act' or 'transaction' may give insufficient
scope to the statutory phrase, particularly if these words are narrowly construed."59

II. UNDERSTANDING CHEVRON
The previous Part introduced three competing interpretations of
the single-scheme exception. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have recently provided another way for courts to settle the controversy
over how to define "a single scheme of criminal misconduct." In
Iredia v. INS, 60 the Fifth Circuit held that because the meaning of
the single-scheme exception was ambiguous, the Supreme Court's
decision in Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 61 required the court to defer to any reasonable test chosen by
the BIA. In Nguyen v. INS,62 the Tenth Circuit likewise held that
Chevron required the court to defer to the BIA's interpretation of
Section 241's "single scheme."63
In Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-step test for
courts to apply in reviewing the interpretation of a statute by an
administrative agency.64 At step one, a reviewing court must determine whether the statute is ambiguous with regard to the precise
question at hand - that is, whether the statute evidences a specific
congressional intent on how to interpret this particular issue.65 If
we think, might well be deemed part of a single scheme, even though they might also be
called separate transactions.
546 F.2d at 451.
57. 31 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994).
58. Balogun, 31 F.3d at 9.
59. Pacheco, 546 F.2d at 451. Interestingly, in Balogun, the First Circuit noted the multicircuit split over how to interpret the exception and the argument for Chevron deference to
the BIA, yet the court tersely stated "petitioner offers no persuasive reason for deviating
from our own longstanding interpretation and the majority of recent decisions." 31 F.3d at 9.
60. 981 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1993).
61. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
62. 991 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1993).
63. 991 F.2d at 623 ("[W]e adopt [the BIA's] interpretation within the Tenth Circuit after
giving due deference to the Board pursuant to Chevron •... "(citations omitted)).
64. 467 U.S. at 842-45.
65. 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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the meaning is unambiguous, a court simply applies that clear
meaning. Second, if the statute is ambiguous, if there is a "gap" in
the statute on this specific policy question, then Chevron directs the
courts to defer to the administrative agency's interpretation of the
statute, so long as that interpretation is "permissible" or "reasonable. "66 Chevron justified such deference on the grounds that when
Congress creates an administrative agency, it implicitly authorizes
the agency to make such gap-filling policy judgments. The Court
explained that this delegation of policy making power is sensible
because the agencies are more politically accountable than the
courts.67
But the courts that have invoked Chevron to justify deference to
the BIA's single-act interpretation of the single-scheme exception
have not rigorously analyzed the issue under either of the two
Chevron steps. Chevron's step one requires a court to have an idea
of how it determines a statute is unambiguous. Similarly, step two
requires an understanding of what types of agency interpretations
are reasonable or permissible. The courts that have applied Chevron to the single-scheme exception have done so without clearly
explaining what they envision these two steps to entail and without
justifying their conclusions at both steps.68
66. 467 U.S. at 845.
67. 467 U.S. at 865-66.
68. For example, in Nguyen v. INS, 991 F.2d 621 {10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit never
actually stated that the exception was ambiguous at step one or why it was ambiguous. The
court apparently held that the meaning of the exception was necessarily ambiguous because
different cases had interpreted it differently; this was the apparent implication of its statements that "[t]he legislative history ... offers no illumination as to congressional intent ...
and the circuits that have interpreted this language are split." 991 F.2d at 623. Similarly, the
Iredia court's analysis went as follows:
Interpretations of ambiguous law by an executive agency are accorded considerable
weight and deference •
• . . The cases cited by both sides agree that there is no clear [c]ongressional intent on
the definition of a "single scheme" of criminal misconduct. Since the legislature has not
spoken, Chevron directs us to accept the interpretation of the statute by the administrative agency so long as it is reasonable.
981 F.2d at 848-49 (citations omitted).
The courts' applications of Chevron's second step to the single-scheme exception have
provided equally little explanation. In Iredia, the Fifth Circuit provided one justification for
its summary acceptance of the single-act test as reasonable - not by explaining how the
single-act interpretation made sense, however, but by crediting the INS's criticism of the rival
single-plan test. The court held that "[t]he INS in this case gives a convincing account of the
reasonableness of its interpretation of the word 'scheme' in explaining that 'a focus on the
pre-planning aspect of criminal activity can lead to theoretical absurdities.'" 981 F.2d at 849.
The court gave as an example of this absurdity "an alien who is convicted of ten bank robberies [who] cannot be deported ... if he establishes the robberies were all carried out pursuant
to a plan that he devised prior to executing them." 981 F.2d at 849. The Tenth Circuit's
analysis of the reasonableness of the BIA's position was even more perfunctory than the
analysis of the Fifth circuit in Iredia; the Nguyen court cited to lredia and simply stated, "We
hold that this is a permissible interpretation of the statute." 991 F.2d at 623. Part III of this
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This Part examines the Supreme Court's Chevron case law to
explain what courts should do at each of Chevron's two steps. Section II.A examines Supreme Court precedents applying Chevron's
step one and concludes that the case law clearly instructs courts to
employ a wide variety of traditional tools of statutory construction
to determine whether a statutory provision is ambiguous. Section
II.B proposes a theory of judicial review at Chevron's step two.
This theory incorporates two definitions: first, that an agency's interpretation is "reasonable" only if it does not stretch the ordinary
meaning of the statutory text too far and is supported by reasoned
deliberation; and second, that the text and logic of Chevron, as well
as the cases that come before and after it, all support a multifactor
analysis of which agency interpretations are "permissible" and
therefore deserving of deference.

A.

Understanding Step One: How Courts Determine
if a Statute is Clear

According to Chevron, the first step in reviewing an agency's
interpretation of a statute focuses only on the clarity of the congressional intent embodied in the statute. As the Chevron Court stated:
"First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the ~atter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. "69 This language suggests that if a statute is clear at step one,
then there is no interpretation to be done by either the court or the
agency. The step-one inquiry into whether a statute embodies a
clear congressional intent raises two questions: What may a court
examine to determine the clarity of congressional intent? And how
much clarity is necessary to constitute an "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"?70 An examination of the Supreme
Court's Chevron case law provides rough answers to both
questions.
In Chevron itself, the Court advised that judges should use their
traditional methods of statutory interpretation to determine
whether a statute embodies a clear congressional intent.71 The
Court's cases applying Chevron have borne out this description of
the step-one inquiry. In addition to examining the statute's text,
Note argues that these courts have misapplied the Chevron rule to the single-scheme
exception.
69. 467 U.S. at 842-43.
70. Or as Justice Scalia phrased this inquiry, "How clear is clear?" See Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520.
71. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect." (emphasis added)).
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the Court has frequently looked to a statute's "structure" or to "the
statute, as a whole" to help find a clear expression of congressional
intent in one of the statute's particular provisions.12 Also, the
Court has relied on the legislative history73 and canons of construction74 to determine the clarity of congressional intent. Thus the
case law makes clear that the Court's inquiry at step one has developed into something akin to the conventional judicial search for the
meaning of a statute by relying on the traditional tools of statutory
construction.1s But this search for a clear intent differs from conventional statutory interpretation in that the Court is not attempt72. See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 42 (1990) (observing that "the statute, as
a whole, clearly expresses Congress' intention" (emphasis added)); Bethesda Hosp. Assn. v.
Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 405 (1988) ("Our conclusion is also supported by the language and
design of the statute as a whole." (emphasis added)); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co.,
486 U.S. 107, 121 (1988); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 514 (1988) ("[T]he
language, structure, and legislative history of the Act fail to support the petitioners in this
case .••" (emphasis added)); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S.
112, 124 (1987) ("The words, structure, and history of the LMRA amendments to the NLRA
clearly reveal" congressional intent (emphasis added)).

73. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 185 (1991) (Deference is required when "the legislative history is ambiguous and unenlightening on the matters with respect to which the regulations deal ..•. " (emphasis added)); Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. at 115-16
(1988); ETSI Pipeline Project, 484 U.S. at 514 ("[T]he language, structure, and legislative
history of the Act fail to support the petitioner in this case ..."(emphasis added)); United
Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. at 124 ("The words, structure, and history of
the LMRA amendments to the NLRA clearly reveal" congressional intent. (emphasis added}); Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985) (Deference is required "unless the legislative history or the purpose and structure of the statute clearly reveal a contrary
intent" (emphasis added)).
74. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Assn., 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991)
("When a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a
reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration."); Dole, 494 U.S. at 36 ("The
traditional canon of construction, noscitur a sociis, dictates that 'words grouped in a list
should be given related meaning.'" (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114-15
(1989))); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (stating a presumption
against retroactive rulemaking); DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.").
75. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647 (1990); R~gents of
Univ. of cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 603 (1988) (White, J., concurring); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. at 123 ("On a pure question of
statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'traditional tools of statutory construction.' If we can do so, then that interpretation must be given
effect, and the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it." (quoting INS v. CardozoFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987))); Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 152 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Chevron's deference requirement, however, was explicitly limited
to cases in which congressional intent cannot be discerned through the use of the traditional
techniques of statutory interpretation."); see also Erika Jones et al., Developments in Judicial
Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 AoMIN.
LJ. 113, 124-25 (1990) (In which Judge Stephen Williams observed that "it is clear from
Chevron itself that 'directly' does not exclude consideration of legislative history. And as to
Congress's speaking to the 'precise question,' Chevron makes it clear that congressional assertions of policy values, even though not addressed directly to the issue before the court,
play an important role ••.." (footnote omitted)).
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ing to discover the best reading of a statutory provision, but whether
the statutory provision evidences a clear intent.
It remains uncertain exactly how much clarity is necessary for a
statute to satisfy step one, because the Court has described this inquiry in a variety of ways. Although Chevron required a court to
find that a statute "clearly" showed that Congress "had an intention
on the precise question at issue" in order to find a statute unambiguous,76 subsequent opinions have reformulated this requirement to
demand a less exacting expression of congressional intent. The
Court has asked merely whether the statute is "ambiguous" or "unclear,"77 or whether the statute has a "plain meaning."78 Rather
than rejecting deference, as Chevron did, by holding that a statute
displays a clear congressional intent on the precise question in dispute, subsequent opinions have rejected deference because the
agency's interpretation was "strained" and "inconsistent" with the
statute's "express language;"79 because the agency's view was not
an "accurate or reasonable interpretation" of the statute;8° because
a "common sense" or "natural reading" of the statute was contrary
to the agency's interpretation;81 or because an agency's interpretation was "at odds with the plain language of the statute itself."82
The trend thus seems to be toward finding that if one reading of
the statute is clearly the most plausible candidate, then the statute is
clear. Commentators have confirmed that in applying such a standard, courts more readily find statutory clarity at step one. For example, Professor Cass Sunstein has observed that in many cases the
Supreme Court has held that congressional intent is clear even
though the statute is sufficiently ambiguous to permit several plausible readings.83 Such opinions often generate stinging dissents that
invoke Chevron's deference rule.84 As a consequence of opening
76. Chevron, 461 U.S. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E. Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498
U.S. 211, 223 (1991}; Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988}; Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben,
488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988); Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 980·81 (1986).
78. See, e.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991} (rejecting deference to
administrative interpretation contrary to statute's plain language); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496
U.S. 478, 482-83 (1990) (deferring to agency interpretation compelled by statute's plain
meaning); Public Employment Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989} ("[N]o deference is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain language of the statute itself."),
79. Bethesda Hosp. Assn. v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 404 (1988).
80. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361,
368 (1986).
81. Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990).
82. Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989).
83. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. Rsv.
2071, 2085 (1990) (citing as examples Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26 (1990}; Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988); and Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985)).
84. See Sunstein, supra note 83, at 2085.
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up the inquiry at step one to include a wide range of traditional
methods of statutory interpretation, the Court has made it easier to
find a sufficiently clear intent in statutes to reject deference to the
agency's interpretations. It would seem to require a great deal of
ambiguity to fail Chevron's first step.85
B.

Understanding Step Two: When an Agency Interpretation is
Unreasonable or Impermissible

The second step of the Chevron test has been the agencyfriendly branch of the Chevron case law. From 1984 through 1992,
the Supreme Court affirmed every agency interpretation that made
it to step two.86 Recently, however, the Court has begun to reject
agency interpretations as unacceptable at Chevron's second step.87
Overall, there has been little explicit guidance from the Courtss as
to how courts should structure their application of Chevron's step
85. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
991 (1992) (The step·one "inquiry has tended in practice to devolve into an inquiry about
whether the statute as a whole generates a clearly preferred meaning. [This] movement from
'specific intention'-to 'plain meaning' to 'plain meaning considering the design of the statute
as a whole' is but one short step away from 'best meaning.' In other words ... the Court has
moved the [step-one] inquiry a long way toward the exercise of independent judgment.'');
Sunstein, supra note 83, at 2091 ("The Court's own decisions ... suggest that the mere fact of
a plausible alternative view is insufficient to trigger the Chevron [deference] rule.'').
In a law review article, Justice Scalia also observed that his method of statutory interpretation will often find that statutes have a clear meaning: "One who finds more often (as I do)
that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other
laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It
is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though
reasonable, I would not personally adopt." Scalia, supra note 70, at 521.
86. Professor Merrill has examined the rationales behind all of the Supreme Court's
Chevron cases. His exhaustive analyses show that until recently whenever the Court rejected
an agency interpretation, it always did so at step one. Merrill, supra note 85, at 1034-38;
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351, 376-77 (1994). At least one commentator has argued that the behavior of lower courts
has been similar. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 83, 96 (1994)
("Regardless of whether a reviewing court is deferential or active, once it reaches step two it
rarely reverses an agency interpretation as unreasonable.'').
87. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing recent Supreme Court precedents rejecting agency interpretations at Chevron's step two).
88. See Merrill, supra note 85, at 993 (observing that "the Court has not given much
consideration to step two at any time throughout the post-Chevron period ... [and] the
frequency declined even further between the earlier and later periods"); Sunstein, supra note
83, at 2104 ("The Supreme Court has given little explicit guidance for determining when
interpretations will be found reasonable. In most of the cases rejecting an agency's view, the
Court has relied on the first step of Chevron, finding an explicit congressional decision on the
point.''). In a panel discussion, Judge Stephen F. Williams questioned whether step two offered any restriction on an agency's interpretations: "When would an agency fail [the steptwo] test? Only when it would flunk the laugh t~st at the Kennedy School of Public Policy?"
Jones et al., supra note 75, at 124. But see infra section 11.B.1-2 (mining the Supreme Court's
case law for relevant factors to be considered at step two).
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two to determine when an agency,s interpretation is unreasonable
or impermissible.89
This section, however, suggests a theory of judicial review at
Chevron's step two, by building on the text and logic of the Chevron opinion and on a careful review of the Supreme Coures other
precedents regarding judicial deference to agency interpretations of
statutes. Section II.B.1 argues that an interpretation is "unreasonable,, if it strays too far from the natural meaning of the words used
in the statutory text and if it is not supported by reasoned deliberation. Section Il.B.2 argues that "permissible,, interpretations only
include those readings supported by Chevron's rationales for deference. This section argues that Chevron itself, as well as other
Supreme Court case law, indicate that courts should look to factors
like agency expertise and consistency of interpretation to determine
whether Congress intended courts to defer to the agency interpretation at issue.

1. Reasonableness
The starting point for the step-two inquiry remains the statutory
text. The court has already scrutinized the text alone and found
that it does not display a sufficiently clear congressional intent to
establish authoritatively one particular interpretation. At step two,
the court proceeds to compare the most ordinary and natural meaning of the text to the interpretation advanced by the administrative
agency. The statutory text thus acts as a continuing constraint on
an agency,s interpretive discretion at step two. "Reasonableness,,
thus requires an agency interpretation to be properly within its delegated policymaking power because the statute,s text embodies the
boundaries of the agency,s policymaking discretion as established
by Congress. Without this constraint, an agency could interpret
statutes in ways utterly at odds with the congressional intent embodied in the statute,s text. Courts reviewing agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes at Chevron's step two should apply its
reasonableness requirement to enforce the boundaries represented
by an even ambiguous statutory text to maintain the agency,s fidelity to congressional will.90
89. Chevron described the types of agency interpretations that would fail at step two
alternatively-using the terms unreasonable and impermissible without providing any independent content to either term. See Chevron, 461 U.S. at 866. This section, however,
proposes a standard of judicial review at step two that gives independent meaning to each
term.
90. In fact, the Supreme Court's delegation doctrine requires that Congress provide an
"intelligible principle" in statutes that delegate policymaking power to administrative agencies. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); J.W. Hampton. Jr. & Co. v.
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Recent Supreme Court cases that have rejected agency interpretations at step two support this understanding of even ambiguous
statutes as providing boundaries on an agency's discretion. For example, in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust
& Savings Bank,91 the Court rejected an agency's request for Chevron deference because "[b]y reading the words 'to the extent' to
mean nothing more than 'if,' the Department has exceeded the
scope of available ambiguity."92 Similarly, in City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,93 the Court rejected an agency's argument for Chevron deference because "the [agency's] interpretation
... goes beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity [the statute] contains.... [The statutory provision] simply cannot be read to contain the [agency's interpretation]."94
Also, an agency interpretation is "reasonable" only if the agency
explains its interpretation of a statute in a rational and sensible way.
Assuring that agencies engage in reasoned deliberation is a traditional justification for judicial review of agency action.9s Moreover,
this component of the step two inquiry is supported by both Chevron and the cases preceding it. In holding that the EPA's construction of the Clean Air Act passed step two, the Chevron Court
justified this conclusion in part by observing that the "agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion. " 96 This requirement that agency interpretations be well-reasoned to merit
deference from a reviewing court was a common factor that courts
considered in reviewing agencies' statutory interpretations before
Chevron. The best-known statement of this principle came in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,rn in which the Court held that the degree of
deference a court should give to an agency's interpretation deUnited States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). The concept of "reasonableness" explained in the text
merely requires that agencies stay within such principles even to the extent they are somewhat ambiguous.
91. 114 s. Ct. 517 (1993).
92. 114 S. Ct. at 531.
93. 114 s. Ct. 1588 (1993).
94. 114 S. Ct. at 1574.
95. See generally Louis LEVENTHAL JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AenoN (1965). One scholar has recently argued that courts should ensure that agencies engage
in reasoned decisionmaking as the predominant value in applying Chevron. See Seidenfeld,
supra note 86.
96. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
The Court explicitly relied on the agency's reasoned deliberation as one of three reasons
(along with the fact that the statute involved a technical policy issue and that the interpretation required the reconciliation of competing policy objectives) for its holding that the ambiguous statutory provision satisfied step two: "In these cases, the Administrator's
interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and
is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling
conflicting policies." 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted).
97. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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pended on "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."98
2. Permissibility
If an agency's interpretation of a statute is reasonable, courts
must next look to whether Chevron's rationale for deference applies. Chevron justifies its presumption of deference to agency interpretations on the rationale that Congress implicitly delegates
interpretive authority to an agency because the agency is a better
policymaker in the face of statutory ambiguity than a court.99 The
Supreme Court's cases both before and after Chevron have consistently looked to two additional factors to help determine when an
agency interpretation is probably the result of a legislative delegation of policymaking power and thus deserves deference: the presence of a particular agency expertise and agency interpretations
that are longstanding and consistent. ·
The importance of technical expertise as a factor that legitimates an agency's interpretation at step two is evident from the
98. 323 U.S. at 140, quoted in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287
n5 (1978); see also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971); Merrill, supra note 85, at 972-74 ("[I]n deciding what degree of
deference to give an executive interpretation, the Court [before Chevron] relied on an eclectic cluster of considerations.••. [One factor] was that interpretations supported by a reasoned analysis were entitled to deference.").
99. Chevron, 461 U.S. at 844-45 ("Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. •.• ['The agency decision] here is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make."). As the Court explained:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely U(>On the incumbent administration's
views of wise policy to inform its judgments.... LI]t is entirely appropriate for [the
Executive Branch] to make such policy choices - resolving the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision .•• really centers
on the wisdom of the agency's policy ••• the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal
judges - who have no constituency - have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices
made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not
judicial ones ••••
467 U.S. at 865-66; see also Jones et al. supra note 75, at 130 (In which Judge Williams observed that "[Chevron] reminds us that where the texts provide no serious guidance, 'interpretation' is really policy choice, and that this belongs with the politically responsible.");
Richard J. Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301, 305-07 (1988) ("When a court 'interprets' imprecise, ambiguous, or conflicting statutory language in a particular manner, the court is resolving a policy issue..•. Like a court, an agency frequently makes policy when it interprets
ambiguous or imprecise terms in the statute that grants the agency its legal powers.••• Once
a court realizes that it is reviewing an agency's resolution of a policy issue ..• comparative
institutional analysis demonstrates that the agency is a more appropriate institution than a
court to resolve the controversy.").

March 1995]

Note-Single-Scheme Exception and Chevron

1127

Chevron opinion itself. In Chevron, the Court held that the EPA's
interpretation of the Clean Air Act satisfied step two in part because it involved a "regulatory scheme [that] is technical and complex ...."1° 0 This focus on technical expertise has much support in
the history of Supreme Court precedents according deference to
agency interpretations of statutes.101
Similarly, the importance of an agency's longstanding and consistent interpretation of a statute was regularly considered in the
Supreme Court's cases before Chevron.102 Moreover, this factor
has been perhaps the most frequently cited justification since Chevron, supporting the Court's approval of agency interpretations at
step two. 103 In a 1993 case, the Court explicitly stated the importance of this factor in affecting the rigor of judicial review at step
two: "[T]he consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due. As we have stated, '[a]n agency
interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the
agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view.' " 104 Thus this Note offers a theory of Chevron's step two that instructs courts to look at
four factors: the extent to which the agency interpretation stretches
100. 467 U.S. at 865; see supra note 96 (full quote). Moreover, in explaining the rule, the
Chevron Court observed that "the principle of deference to administrative interpretations
'has been consistently followed by this Court whenever .•• a full understanding of the force
of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations."' 467 U.S. at 844 (emphasis
added). The Court explicitly contrasted agencies with the courts, observing that in specialized administrative areas, "Judges are not experts in the field." 467 U.S. at 865.
101. This is true for cases coming both before and after Chevron. See Aluminum Co. of
Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., ·467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.25 (1977); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,
382 (1961); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1958). Cases after Chevron
in which the Court has observed the importance of agency expertise in accepting the agency's
interpretation of a statute include Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (1991);
Litton Fmancial Printing Division v. NLRB, 501U.S.190 (1991); and Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
102. See United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. i80, 291
(1981); Watt v. Alaska, 451U.S.259, 272-73 (1981); General Elec. Co. v. Gilert, 429 U.S. 125,
143 (1976); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974).
103. See, e.g., California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 (1990) (referring to "the deference
this Court must accord to long-standing and well-entrenched decisions, especially those interpreting statutes that underlie complex regulatory regimes" (emphasis added)); NLRB v.
United Food & Commercial Workers' Union, 484 U.S. 112, 124 n.20 (1987).
Moreover, in at least one instance, the Court has explicitly rejected deference to the BIA,
in part because of the inconsistent interpretations it had taken over the years. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 ("An additional reason for rejecting the INS's request for heightened deference to its position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA
has taken through the years."); see infra section III.B.2 (arguing that the BIA's interpretation
of the single-scheme exception merits less deference because of the inconsistent ways it has
interpreted the exception).
104. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. a. 2151, 2161 (1993) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273
(1981)) (emphasis added)).
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too far from the statutory text, the agency's reasoning, the presence
of agency expertise, and how longstanding and consistent the
agency's interpretation has been. Such a multi-factor approach at
step two is supported by the Supreme Court's cases predating Chevron, by Chevron itself, and by the cases since Chevron.1os
ill.

APPLYING CHEVRONTO THE SINGLE-SCHEME EXCEPTION

This Part takes the understanding of Chevron developed in Part
II and applies it to the controversy over the proper definition of the
single-scheme exception, concluding that courts should reject the
BIA's single-act test. It provides two alternative arguments to
reach this conclusion. Section III.A argues that the text of the single-scheme exception embodies a clear congressional intent to apply the single-plan test. Section III.B then argues that, even if the
105. Before Chevron, the Supreme Court lacked a single doctrine that governed how
courts should review agencies' statutory interpretations. See Merrill, supra note 85, at 972.
Instead courts engaged in a case-by.case determination of when to defer to a given agency
and when not to defer. In 1976, Judge Henry Friendly described the ad hoc character of the
case law, observing that "two lines of Supreme Court decisions on this subject .•• are analytically in conflict . • . • Leading cases support[] the view that great deference must be given to
the decisions of an administrative agency applying a statute •••• However, there is [also] an
impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for administrative judgment"
on questions of statutory interpretation. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544
F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), affd. sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S.
249 (1977).
In making these ad hoc determinations, courts relied on a whole host of considerations,
which commentators later referred to as "deference factors." See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 85,
at 972-75; Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring The Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 986 (1987). For example, deference to an agency
was generally more appropriate if the issue involved an agency's particular technical expertise or if the agency had held the same interpretation for a long time. See supra notes 101-03
and accompanying text. Although courts often relied on these deference factors before
Chevron, their role in the post-Chevron era is a matter of hot debate among commentators.
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALB J. ON REo. 283,
299 (1985) (In which then-Judge Starr opined that one of the leading "unresolved issues"
after Chevron is whether "any of the [traditionally significant] factors ••• are still relevant.").
They have never been explicitly incorporated into Chevron's two-part test, and Justice Scalia,
for one, has argued that such factors are now irrelevant to a court's decision whether to defer
because Chevron replaced the multi-factor decision on deference with a broad presumption
that courts must defer to an agency's statutory interpretations unless deference is inappropriate under either of Chevron's two steps. See Scalia, supra note 70, at 517, 521 (arguing that
under Chevron, "there is no longer any justification for giving 'special' deference to 'longstanding and consistent' agency interpretations of law•••• [T]hose concepts are no longer
relevant, or no longer relevant in the same way."). Justice Breyer, on the other hand, in an
article written when he was an appellate judge, explicitly counseled in favor of continuing use
of these "deference factors," as a guide to when to defer to an agency's view. Stephen
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L REv. 363, 373, 382
(1986) ("Despite its attractive simplicity, [the Chevron approach] seems unlikely in the long
run, to replace the complex [deference factor] approach•.•• [P]ressures ••. will tend to build
a jurisprudence of 'degree and difference' into Chevron's word 'permissible.' "). This debate
appears to have been resolved by the Supreme Court's case law. The factors have not disappeared from Supreme Court opinions in the Chevron era, but rather the Court continues to
cite to them as reasons for its deference decisions. See Merrill, supra note 85, at 980-85; infra
notes 130-141 and accompanying text.

March 1995]

Note-Single-Scheme Exception and Chevron

1129

exception does not demonstrate that Congress clearly intended to
apply the single-plan test, courts should reject the BIA's single-act
test as an unreasonable and impermissible reading of the statute.
A. Step One Applied to the Single-Scheme Exception
Section II.A concluded that a court can use its traditional tools
of statutory construction at Chevron's step one in determining
whether a statutory provision is ambiguous. A broad inquiry employing these tools indicates that the single-scheme exception
clearly embraces the single-plan test. Specifically, the statutory
text's plain meaning and an established canon of construction in
immigration law seem to require that courts adopt the single-plan
test.
1. The Ordinary Meaning of "Scheme"
The word scheme has a natural and ordinary meaning. A
scheme is a plan, and especially a plan that involves a coherent set
of related parts. The American Heritage Dictionary defines a
"scheme" as
1. A systematic plan of action. 2. An orderly combination of related
parts or elements. 3. A plan, esp. a secret or devious one; plot. 4. A
chart, diagram, or outline of a system or object. 5. A visionary
plan. 106
Thus the natural and ordinary meaning of scheme combines two
ideas. The primary idea is of a conscious plan or design. Such a

plan or design requires a certain forward-looking conceptual state
of mind on the part of the planner. The second idea is that this
design involves related, coherent parts that are systematic and or106. .AMERICAN HERITAGE D1cnoNARY 1097 (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis added); see also
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S CoLLEGIATE D1cnoNARY 1044 (10th ed.1993) (defining scheme as "l
a archaic (1 ): a mathematical or astronomical diagram (2): a representation of the astrological aspects of the planets at a particular time b: a graphic sketch or outline 2: a concise
statement or table: EPITOME 3: a plan or program of action; esp: a crafty or secret one 4:
a systematic or organized framework: DESIGN syn see PLAN" (emphasis added));
RooET's II THE NEW THESAURUS 866 (1988) (giving synonyms for scheme: 1. A method for
making, doing, or accomplishing something. 1. DESIGN ..• 2. A secret plan to achieve an
evil or illegal end. 2. PLOT"); WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE THESAURUS 705 (1976) (giving synonyms for scheme: "1 syn PLAN 1, blueprint, design, game plan, project, strategy •.. 2 syn
PLOT 2, cabal, conspiracy, covin, intrigue, machination, practice"); WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY D1cnoNARY 1044 (1984) (defining scheme as "1. A systematic plan of
action. 2. An orderly combination of related or successive parts or elements: SYSTEM. 3. A
plan, esp. a secret or underhand one: PLOT. 4. A chart, diagram, or outline of a system or
object 5. A visionary plan." (emphasis added)).
The Supreme Court has often sanctioned the use of dictionaries as an effort to get at the
natural and plain meaning of statutory text. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 86, at 355-57
(citing nine Supreme Court cases that relied on dictionaries in 1988 and 22 cases in 1992 and
observing "a rise in the use of dictionaries" by the Supreme Court); see also A. Raymond
Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L.
& Pun. PoLY. 71 (1994); Note, Looking It Up: The Use of Dictionaries in Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994).
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derly, like a chart or diagram. These two ideas combine into a

scheme when the related parts cohere because of a conscious design
or plan. The ordinary and natural meaning of "single scheme of
criminal misconduct" therefore is a plan, plot, or design to commit
a coherent set of related crimes. The single-plan interpretation of
"single scheme of criminal misconduct" accurately embodies the
statute's natural and ordinary meaning, by focusing on whether the
alien planned the crimes and executed those crimes as the related
parts of one systematic plan or plot.101
2. A Canon of Construction
In addition to the statute's natural meaning, a traditional canon
of statutory construction supports finding that the single-scheme exception clearly embodies the single-plan test. The Supreme Court
has established a customary rule on how to interpret deportation
laws. The Court has held that courts should read deportation statutes quite narrowly and resolve all doubts in favor of the alien. The
Court explained that
deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile . . . . [S]ince the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom
beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible
meanings of the words used.1os
This traditional rule of interpretation supports the single-plan

test because that test reads the exception in the way most generous
to aliens. The BIA's single-act test, on the other hand, least protects the interests of aliens by nearly reading the exception out of
the statute - applying it only in the extremely rare circumstances
when the alien's crimes result from a single physical act. Similarly
the First Circuit's time-to-reflect test is generally less generous to
aliens because it requires a very short time span between the
crimes. The BIA, in fact, has criticized the single-plan test as being
too generous to aliens because it "would allow for criminals to commit numerous similar crimes over a period of time, but still avoid
deportability... ,"109 The Supreme Court, however, has made clear
107. Similarly, the idea of a scheme in criminal law involves conscious design on the part
of the criminal. See FED. R. C!uM. P. 8(a}, which permits separate offenses to be joined in a
single trial so long as they occur pursuant to a common scheme). Otherwise, the Rule does
not permit separate offenses to be joined out of concern that juries will cumulate evidence;
see also WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, C!uMINAL PROCEDURE§ 17.l(a) (2d ed.
1992) which discusses case law defining "common scheme".
108. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (emphasis added). In a 1987 decision
that rejected Chevron deference to the BIA, the Supreme Court approvingly cited the Fong
Haw Tan canon as a "longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien," although the Court did not rely on the canon. INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
109. In re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992WL195812, at *5 (BIA May 221992).
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that immigration statutes should be interpreted wherever possible
to avoid deportability. The single-plan test is thus consistent with
the Supreme Court's interpretive presumption regarding the congressional intent embodied in the deportation laws.110
Some courts and the INS, however, have rejected the singleplan test by invoking the canon that requires avoiding statutory interpretations that lead to "absurd results." 111 These courts suggest
that the single-plan test in practice would lead to "theoretical absurdities," such as permitting an alien who committed multiple robberies to avoid deportation simply by alleging that the robberies
were all carried out pursuant to a prior plan.112 The experiences of
courts that have applied the single-plan test, however, belie this allegation of its possible absurd consequences. Although the singleplan test may be more generous to aliens than the BIA's test, it
does not necessarily provide an effortless way for convicted aliens
to avoid deportation. Single-plan courts have defined plan strictly
to require a close relationship between the crimes, have required
that evidence factually support an alien's contention of a single
plan, and have allowed the INS to establish a presumption of no
single plan where the facts show that such a plan is unlikely.113 For
example, courts have presumed that no single plan existed when the
crimes were separated by a significant amount of time. The Wood
110. A plausible argument can be made that courts cannot use canons to determine that
the meaning of a statute is clear at Chevron's step one, because courts only employ canons
when the meaning of a statutory text is ambiguous. But the Fong Haw Tan canon can be
employed at step one as a guide to congressional intent, which is how the Supreme Court
articulated it: "[W)e will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond
that which is required ...." Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10. Because the goal of Chevron's
first step is to determine the clarity of congressional intent, a court should employ all guides
to congressional intent. Cf. Merrill, supra note 85, at 988 (observing that "the canons clearly
qualify as a 'traditional tool of statutory construction' "but also acknowledging the argument
above). At least one commentator has argued that a canon very similar to the Fong Haw Tan
canon should continue to be applied as consistent with Chevron. See Note, Chevron and the
Canon Concerning Indians, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 1015, 1022 (1993) (arguing that "[b)efore
applying a canon, a court should determine if its application is consistent with the Court's
post·Chevron presumptions concerning congressional intent" and concluding that the canon
requiring statutes to be interpreted favorably to Indians should continue to be applied); see
also Denise W. DeFranco, Note, Chevron and Canons of Statutory Construction, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 829 (1990).
The Fong Haw Tan canon may also be a particularly strong guide to congressional intent
regarding the single·scheme exception because Fong Haw Tan was decided in 1948 - four
years before the Congress that adopted the 1952 legislation containing the single-scheme
exception. Moreover, the Fong Haw Tan Court was construing language that, like § 241,
restricted the category of aliens otherwise deportable. Therefore, it is likely that the 1952.
Congress understood the manner in which the courts would construe the single-scheme exception in the new immigration statute.
111. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-60 (1892).
112. Iredia v. INS, 981 F.2d 847, 849 {5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 203 (1993).
113. See supra note 51 {discussing the case law in which single-plan courts created "the
·Chanan presumption" that allows the government to meet its burden of proof by showing
that the alien's crimes are separated by a long time interval or are otherwise unrelated).
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court explained that in some cases the government can meet its burden to show no single scheme merely by pointing to certain facts:
It may be that in some cases the proof of the commission of two
crimes may by the very nature of the crimes themselves, or the time
or circumstances of their commission, be reasonable, substantial and
probative evidence that they did not arise out of a single scheme of
criminal misconduct.114

In several cases, single-plan courts have upheld deportation orders despite an alien's contention that his crimes arose out of a single scheme. For example, in both Nason v. INS11S and LeonHemandez v. INS, 116 the courts held that the government had met
its burden of proof in part due to the long time interval between the
crimes, despite evidence regarding the similarity of the crimes and
despite the aliens' contentions that the crimes were pursuant to a
single plan.117 Similarly, in Chanan Din Khan v. Barber,11s where
the alien had been convicted of two counts of willfully evading income taxes for two consecutive years, the court held that because
the alien had not produced sufficient evidence of a single scheme,
his bare contention that there was a scheme was inadequate.
The single-plan test thus requires immigration judges and the
BIA to look at all the circumstances surrounding the crimes and to
make a factual :finding whether the crimes actually arose out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct. While such :findings are open
to all the problems inherent in trying to determine what actually
happened after the fact, such a test does not necessarily lead to
"theoretical absurdities."
Nor have the courts applying the single-plan test hobbled INS
enforcement efforts. Under the single-plan test, the INS clearly can
institute deportation against aliens who commit crimes that appear
prima facie unrelated or are separated by such a long time interval
that it is unlikely that the crimes were part of a single plan. In these
cases, the burden then effectively shifts to the defendant alien to
produce some evidence of a plan, and the immigration judge can
evaluate the credibility and persuasiveness of such evidence.119

B. Step Two Applied to the Single-Scheme Exception
Even though the single-plan test appears to capture the natural
and ordinary meaning of the single-scheme exception, one could
114. Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 1959).
115. 394 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
116. 926 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1991).
117. Nason, 394 F.2d at 227; Leon-Hernandez, 926 F.2d at 904-05.
118. 253 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 920 (1958).
119. See generally note 51 (describing how the courts created the Chanan presumption,
permitting the INS to meet its burden of proof in such cases).
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argue that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not express a
clear congressional intent on this precise issue because the phrase is
not defined by the statute, nor does the legislative history tell us
how to define it. 120 A court taking this approach would then have
to move on to Chevron's step two and defer to any reasonable BIA
interpretation of this ambiguous language. This section argues,
however, that courts should reject the BIA's single-act interpretation of the single-scheme exception as an unreasonable and impermissible interpretation of the immigration statute. Section III.B.1
compares the statutory text to the BIA's interpretation to conclude
that the BIA's view is not "reasonable," because it embodies a
highly strained reading of the statute and because the BIA has not
provided any detailed reasoning to support such a strained reading.
Section ill.B.2 then argues that the BIA's interpretation also does
not merit judicial deference as a "permissible" reading of the
statute.
1. Why the BIA's Reading is Unreasonable

The BIA's single-act interpretation of the single-scheme exception embodies a strained and insufficiently reasoned reading of the
statute. First, the BIA's test belies the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory text, focusing instead on whether the crimes are
part of a single physical act. Even if scheme does not clearly mean
plan, it surely does not mean act. 121 As the Ninth Circuit has
explained:
[T]his is not what the statute says. The Board of Immigration Appeals ... has applied the statute as if it read "single criminal act."
We must take the language of the statute as we find it. It says "not
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct"; it does not say
"not arising out of a single criminal act." If such latter reading had
been the intent of Congress they could have so declared.122

Other courts have agreed. For example, the First Circuit reasoned
that "to equate 'single scheme' with 'act' or 'transaction' may give
insufficient scope to the statutory phrase, particularly if these words
are narrowly construed. As other courts have noted, the Congress
120. This language is thus arguably ambiguous for the same reason that the language
"stationary source" was ambiguous in Chevron. See also supra notes 76·85 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty over what qualifies as sufficiently ambiguous to trigger
step two under Chevron.).
121. As discussed above, dictionaries and thesauri demonstrate that the plain and ordinary meaning of scheme is a "plan" or a "design" or a "system." See supra section III.A.1.
None of these sources, however, equated the word scheme with the words act or episode.
Although the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held the BIA's single·act interpretation of the
single·scheme exception to be reasonable, see supra notes 60·63 and accompanying text,
neither provided rigorous analysis of the BIA's view, see supra note 68, and the Fifth Circuit
later expressed doubt about the wisdom of its previous decision, see supra note 16.
122. Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1959) (footnote omitted).
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could have chosen more precise words. " 123 And the Second Circuit
declared that "[t]he statutory language, 'a single scheme of criminal
misconduct,' is not so narrow as a single criminal act or transaction. "124 Thus even if the statutory term scheme is somewhat ambiguous, the BIA's "interpretation . . . goes beyond the scope of
whatever ambiguity [the statute] contains."125
Additionally, the BIA has not "considered the matter in [the
kind of] detailed and reasoned fashion" 126 that merits judicial deference. The BIA has offered no justification for equating the words
scheme and act or for ignoring the plain and natural meaning of the
statutory text. 121 Nor has the BIA offered any reason to ignore the
canon articulated in the Supreme Court's Fong Haw Tan case that
presumes Congress intends a restrictive reading of deportation provisions.128 Finally, the BIA's argument that the single-plan test
would lead to "theoretical absurdities" is belied by the experiences
of the courts applying the single-plan test and the nuances of the
test that single-plan courts have developed to accommodate the
practical realities of deportation enforcement.129
2. Why the BIA's Interpretation is Impermissible

Perhaps the most persuasive reason that courts have traditionally cited in deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute is
the presence of a highly complicated question calling on an agency's
special expertise,13° but this rationale for deference is inapplicable
to the single-scheme exception. This attention to expertise reflects
Congress's understandable desire to refer questions to the institution - whether a court or an agency - with the most competence
to answer the question. But the definition of the single-scheme exception does not seem to call on the particular technical competence of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Rather, divining what
Congress meant by "scheme" seems to fall more comfortably within
the courts' specialized skills of both statutory construction and evaluating criminal behavior.
The other traditional deference factor most often cited by courts
.as a reason to accord an agency deference - the longstanding and
123. Pacheco v. INS, 546 F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977).
124. Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223, 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
125. Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1594 (1994) (rejecting an
agency's argument for Chevron deference because "the [agency's] interpretation ••• goes
beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity [the statute] contains").
126. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
127. See supra note 68.
128. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
130. Indeed, such a question of expertise was involved in Chevron itself, as was explicitly
noted by the Court. 467 U.S. at 865.
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consistent character of an agency's view131 - is similarly inapplicable to interpreting the single-scheme exception. This factor might
seem to weigh in the BIA's favor because the Board has referred to
the Adetiba test as its "historic approach."132 Nevertheless, an examination of the BIA case law reveals that the Board has actually
interpreted the single-scheme exception in a variety of ways.133
Although consistently rejecting the single-plan approach,134 the
BIA has formulated its interpretation of "single scheme" in language of extraordinary diversity. The BIA has employed a variety
of formulations to find that multiple crimes did not arise out of a
single scheme, by focusing on such different factors as the unitary
character of the alien's actions;13s the number of victims;136 the passage of time between crimes;137 the necessity of the first crime as
malting possible further crimes;138 whether the crimes were motivated by the same impulse;139 a "moral" characterization of the
crimes;140 and whether the crimes shared a specific objective.141
These diverse characterizations suggest much less the principled
consistency of the BIA's view and much more the Board's desire to
alter its reading of the statute to accommodate various factual
circumstances.

131. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
132. See In re Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, 1992 WL 195812, at *l (BIA May 22,
1992).
133. Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (The Supreme Court rejected deference to an interpretation of the Immigration statute by the BIA, in part because
of "the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years." The Court
observed that "[t]he BIA has [interpreted the statute] in at least three different ways.").
134. See Adetiba, 1992 WL 195812, at *l; In re J,

~

I & N Dec. 382 (BIA 1954).

135. See In re B, I & N Dec. 236, 239 (BIA 1958) (finding that a single scheme existed,
where "essentially one episode existed" (emphasis added}}.
136. See In re B, 8 I & N Dec. at 239 (observing that a single scheme has been found
"[w]here there is in fact one physical act affecting one person" (emphasis added}}.
137. See In re B, 8 I & N Dec. at 239 (observing that a single scheme has been found
"[w]here there are a series of similar acts which occurred at 'one time'" (emphasis added)).
138. See In re B, 8 I & N Dec. at 239 (observing that a single scheme has been found
"[w]here the acts occur within a comparatively short time of each other, involve the same
parties, and the first act or acts are committed for the purpose of making possible the specific
criminal objective accomplished by the last of the criminal acts" (emphasis added)).
139. See In re Pataki, 15 I & N Dec. 324, 326 (BIA 1974) (observing that a single scheme
has been found where "both crimes were committed within a few minutes of each other as
the result of the same criminal impulse" (emphasis added}}.
140. See In re D, 5 I & N Dec. 728, 730 (BIA 1954) (holding there is a single scheme
where "morally the transaction constitutes only a single wrong" (emphasis added)).
141. See In re Z, 6 I & N Dec. 167, 171 (BIA 1954) (holding there is a single scheme
where "both [crimes] are .•. designed to accomplish a specific and limited criminal objective"
(emphasis added}}.
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CoNcLusmN: THE CASE FOR STEP Two

This Note has argued that under the analysis of Chevron, courts
should reject the BIA's interpretation of the single-scheme exception. It has provided two alternative arguments to support this conclusion - one at each of Chevron's two steps.142 Given that when
the Supreme Court has rejected an agency's interpretation under
Chevron, it has almost always done so at the first step of the analysis,143 it would seem most in line with this precedent for courts to
reject the BIA's test at Chevron's first step. Nevertheless, this Note
concludes that rejecting the BIA's test at the second step is a preferable approach.144 In this regard, it has provided a standard of
judicial review for courts to apply at this second step derived from
traditional judicial insights regarding when courts should defer to
agency interpretations of statutes. This understanding of step two
focuses on the underlying important questions of which institution
142. The necessity of providing both arguments is due to the uncertainty in when the
Supreme Court's standards will find a statute to be sufficiently ambiguous to require a court
to ignore what might seem to be the most plausible interpretation and move on to the analy·
sis at step two. See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
143. According to Professor Merrill's encyclopedic analyses, through the 1992 term, the
Supreme Court clearly applied the Chevron framework to reject agency interpretations fourteen times. In all fourteen cases, it rejected the agency's view at step one by finding that the
statute embodied a clear meaning that was different from the view adopted by the agency.
Merrill, Textualism, supra note 85, at 1034-38; Merrill, supra note 86, at 376-77. But see supra
notes 91-94 and accompanying text (describing two recent cases where the Court apparently
struck down agency interpretations at step two).
144. If a court rejects an agency's interpretation at Chevron's step two, it remains unclear
whether the court should itself independently interpret the statute or remand to the agency
for a new interpretation. Strong institutional arguments can be made in favor of a court
independently construing a statute after it has rejected deference to an agency at step two.
First, if a court knows that it will have to remand, then the only way it will be able to interpret the statute itself is by finding sufficient clarity to satisfy Chevron's step one. Therefore,
remand may give a court incentive to strain to find clarity at step one in order to adopt its
own interpretation. Second, if courts independently interpret after rejecting an agency interpretation at step two, this provides an even stronger incentive for agencies to do a good job
of interpreting the statute the first time around. Finally, such independent interpretation
may be more efficient than a time-consuming remand. If a court were to interpret independently the single-scheme exception after rejecting the BIA's single-act test, the arguments
provided in section III.A would support a single-plan test interpretation. Additionally, a
court might elaborate on this test regarding how closely related the crimes need to be to
satisfy the idea of coherence in the word scheme - for example, by requiring that all the
crimes be necessary to accomplish one specific objective and that they be close in time and
space.
Nevertheless the logic of Chevron seems to require a court to remand the interpretive
question to the agency. If a court remanded the single-scheme exception to the BIA for a
second chance to fill the policy gap in the statute, what would be a reasonable and permissible interpretation? This Note has concluded both that the single-act test is simply too
strained a reading of the statutory text and that the single-plan test embodies a natural and
ordinary meaning of the text. Thus the BIA could adopt a version of the single-plan test,
perhaps as elaborated earlier. Whether or not the BIA could reasonably and permissibly
formulate some other standard, such as the Fust Circuit's time-to-reflect test, should turn on
how well-reasoned the BIA's new interpretation is and how far it stretches the statutory text.
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is better suited to answer the interpretive question and whether
Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency.
Such an application of Chevron's step two is preferable to a
Chevron that invariably rejects agency interpretations at step one,
for three reasons. First, such a step-two analysis is the best way to
allocate questions of statutory interpretation between institutions
by comparing their · strengths and weaknesses. As Chevron observed, agencies are often better interpreters of statutes where they
are more politically accountable and have greater expertise than
courts. But agencies may be driven by political pressures to warp
the meaning of statutes or by the pressures of a heavy administrative caseload to engage in cursory and inconsistent reasoning.
Moreover, for some questions of statutory interpretation the agencies may not possess a comparative advantage in expertise over the
courts. In such situations, courts should police the agency's reasoning and ensure that the agency's discretion is confined to the
boundaries of meaning that Congress established in the statute.
Second, a focus on step two fosters a healthy institutional tension or dialogue between the judicial and administrative branches.
Because courts always have the last word in interpreting statutes,
the genius of Chevron was in requiring the courts presumptively to
defer to an agency's interpretation that they otherwise would be
under no requirement even to consider. But such a presumption
should not be absolute. Rejecting agency interpretations at step
two helpfully requires the courts to justify nondeference with good
reasons - to explain why the court is a better interpreter of a particular statute in any given case. This understanding of Chevron's
step two provides proper incentives both to the courts - requiring
them to defer to agency interpretations unless they can articulate a
good reason not to - and to the agencies, letting them know that
courts will defer to their interpretations only if they engage in detailed and reasoned analysis and do not stretch the statute's text to~
far beyond its ordinary meaning.
Finally, by requiring legitimate reasons for courts to reject
agency interpretations even where a statute is arguably ambiguous,
this understanding of step two avoids a disingenuous and perplexing debate about whether a statute is sufficiently clear. Although
the clarity of congressional intent is surely one good reason to reject unacceptable agency interpretations, it does not provide helpful
guidance as to which is the better institution to interpret statutes
that are not crystal clear. This Note concludes that Chevron's step
two provides an effective way for courts to take up their traditional
historical role of policing agency action. Such a role offers the best
allocation of authority among institutions: agencies would have
flexibility to make policy choices that would be presumptively valid,
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and courts would retain the ultimate power to cabin agency discretion within the bounds of the law, but only by providing particular
good reasons for rejecting the agencies' views.

